aes_gcm_siv/

lib.rs

#![no_std]
#![cfg_attr(docsrs, feature(doc_cfg))]
#![doc = include_str!("../README.md")]
#![doc(
    html_logo_url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RustCrypto/meta/master/logo.svg",
    html_favicon_url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RustCrypto/meta/master/logo.svg"
)]
#![warn(missing_docs, rust_2018_idioms)]

//! # Usage
//!
//! Simple usage (allocating, no associated data):
//!
#![cfg_attr(feature = "getrandom", doc = "```")]
#![cfg_attr(not(feature = "getrandom"), doc = "```ignore")]
//! # fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn core::error::Error>> {
//! // NOTE: requires the `getrandom` feature is enabled
//!
//! use aes_gcm_siv::{
//!     aead::{Aead, AeadCore, Generate, Key, KeyInit},
//!     Aes256GcmSiv, Nonce // Or `Aes128GcmSiv`
//! };
//!
//! let key = Key::<Aes256GcmSiv>::generate();
//! let cipher = Aes256GcmSiv::new(&key);
//!
//! let nonce = Nonce::generate(); // MUST be unique per message
//! let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(&nonce, b"plaintext message".as_ref())?;
//!
//! let plaintext = cipher.decrypt(&nonce, ciphertext.as_ref())?;
//! assert_eq!(&plaintext, b"plaintext message");
//! # Ok(())
//! # }
//! ```
//!
//! ## In-place Usage (eliminates `alloc` requirement)
//!
//! This crate has an optional `alloc` feature which can be disabled in e.g.
//! microcontroller environments that don't have a heap.
//!
//! The [`AeadInOut::encrypt_in_place`] and [`AeadInOut::decrypt_in_place`]
//! methods accept any type that impls the [`aead::Buffer`] trait which
//! contains the plaintext for encryption or ciphertext for decryption.
//!
//! Enabling the `arrayvec` feature of this crate will provide an impl of
//! [`aead::Buffer`] for `arrayvec::ArrayVec` (re-exported from the [`aead`] crate as
//! [`aead::arrayvec::ArrayVec`]), and enabling the `bytes` feature of this crate will
//! provide an impl of [`aead::Buffer`] for `bytes::BytesMut` (re-exported from the
//! [`aead`] crate as [`aead::bytes::BytesMut`]).
//!
//! It can then be passed as the `buffer` parameter to the in-place encrypt
//! and decrypt methods:
//!
#![cfg_attr(all(feature = "getrandom", feature = "arrayvec"), doc = "```")]
#![cfg_attr(
    not(all(feature = "getrandom", feature = "arrayvec")),
    doc = "```ignore"
)]
//! # fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn core::error::Error>> {
//! // NOTE: requires the `arrayvec` and `getrandom` features are enabled
//!
//! use aes_gcm_siv::{
//!     aead::{AeadInOut, AeadCore, Buffer, Generate, Key, KeyInit, arrayvec::ArrayVec},
//!     Aes256GcmSiv, Nonce, // Or `Aes128GcmSiv`
//! };
//!
//! let key = Key::<Aes256GcmSiv>::generate();
//! let cipher = Aes256GcmSiv::new(&key);
//!
//! let nonce = Nonce::generate(); // 96-bits; unique per message
//! let mut buffer: ArrayVec<u8, 128> = ArrayVec::new(); // Note: buffer needs 16-bytes overhead for auth tag
//! buffer.extend_from_slice(b"plaintext message");
//!
//! // Encrypt `buffer` in-place, replacing the plaintext contents with ciphertext
//! cipher.encrypt_in_place(&nonce, b"", &mut buffer)?;
//!
//! // `buffer` now contains the message ciphertext
//! assert_ne!(buffer.as_ref(), b"plaintext message");
//!
//! // Decrypt `buffer` in-place, replacing its ciphertext context with the original plaintext
//! cipher.decrypt_in_place(&nonce, b"", &mut buffer)?;
//! assert_eq!(buffer.as_ref(), b"plaintext message");
//! # Ok(())
//! # }
//! ```

pub use aead::{self, AeadCore, AeadInOut, Error, Key, KeyInit, KeySizeUser};

#[cfg(feature = "aes")]
pub use aes;

use aead::{TagPosition, inout::InOutBuf};
use cipher::{
    BlockCipherEncrypt, BlockSizeUser, InnerIvInit, StreamCipherCore,
    array::Array,
    consts::{U12, U16},
};
use polyval::{Polyval, universal_hash::UniversalHash};

/// AES is optional to allow swapping in hardware-specific backends.
#[cfg(feature = "aes")]
use aes::{Aes128, Aes256};

/// Maximum length of associated data (from RFC8452 § 6).
pub const A_MAX: u64 = 1 << 36;

/// Maximum length of plaintext (from RFC8452 § 6).
pub const P_MAX: u64 = 1 << 36;

/// Maximum length of ciphertext (from RFC8452 § 6).
pub const C_MAX: u64 = (1 << 36) + 16;

/// AES-GCM-SIV nonces.
pub type Nonce = Array<u8, U12>;

/// AES-GCM-SIV tags.
pub type Tag = Array<u8, U16>;

/// AES-GCM-SIV with a 128-bit key.
#[cfg(feature = "aes")]
pub type Aes128GcmSiv = AesGcmSiv<Aes128>;

/// AES-GCM-SIV with a 256-bit key.
#[cfg(feature = "aes")]
pub type Aes256GcmSiv = AesGcmSiv<Aes256>;

/// Counter mode with a 32-bit little endian counter.
type Ctr32LE<Aes> = ctr::CtrCore<Aes, ctr::flavors::Ctr32LE>;

/// AES-GCM-SIV: Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption Cipher (RFC 8452).
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct AesGcmSiv<Aes> {
    /// Key generating key used to derive AES-GCM-SIV subkeys.
    key_generating_key: Aes,
}

impl<Aes> KeySizeUser for AesGcmSiv<Aes>
where
    Aes: KeySizeUser,
{
    type KeySize = Aes::KeySize;
}

impl<Aes> KeyInit for AesGcmSiv<Aes>
where
    Aes: BlockSizeUser<BlockSize = U16> + BlockCipherEncrypt + KeyInit,
{
    fn new(key_bytes: &Key<Self>) -> Self {
        Self {
            key_generating_key: Aes::new(key_bytes),
        }
    }
}

impl<Aes> From<Aes> for AesGcmSiv<Aes>
where
    Aes: BlockSizeUser<BlockSize = U16> + BlockCipherEncrypt,
{
    fn from(key_generating_key: Aes) -> Self {
        Self { key_generating_key }
    }
}

impl<Aes> AeadCore for AesGcmSiv<Aes>
where
    Aes: BlockSizeUser<BlockSize = U16> + BlockCipherEncrypt + KeyInit,
{
    type NonceSize = U12;
    type TagSize = U16;
    const TAG_POSITION: TagPosition = TagPosition::Postfix;
}

impl<Aes> AeadInOut for AesGcmSiv<Aes>
where
    Aes: BlockSizeUser<BlockSize = U16> + BlockCipherEncrypt + KeyInit,
{
    fn encrypt_inout_detached(
        &self,
        nonce: &Nonce,
        associated_data: &[u8],
        buffer: InOutBuf<'_, '_, u8>,
    ) -> Result<Tag, Error> {
        Cipher::<Aes>::new(&self.key_generating_key, nonce)
            .encrypt_inout_detached(associated_data, buffer)
    }

    fn decrypt_inout_detached(
        &self,
        nonce: &Nonce,
        associated_data: &[u8],
        buffer: InOutBuf<'_, '_, u8>,
        tag: &Tag,
    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
        Cipher::<Aes>::new(&self.key_generating_key, nonce).decrypt_inout_detached(
            associated_data,
            buffer,
            tag,
        )
    }
}

/// AES-GCM-SIV: Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption Cipher (RFC8452).
struct Cipher<Aes>
where
    Aes: BlockSizeUser<BlockSize = U16> + BlockCipherEncrypt,
{
    /// Encryption cipher.
    enc_cipher: Aes,

    /// POLYVAL universal hash.
    polyval: Polyval,

    /// Nonce.
    nonce: Nonce,
}

impl<Aes> Cipher<Aes>
where
    Aes: BlockSizeUser<BlockSize = U16> + BlockCipherEncrypt + KeyInit,
{
    /// Initialize AES-GCM-SIV, deriving per-nonce message-authentication and
    /// message-encryption keys.
    pub(crate) fn new(key_generating_key: &Aes, nonce: &Nonce) -> Self {
        let mut mac_key = polyval::Key::default();
        let mut enc_key = Array::default();
        let mut block = cipher::Block::<Aes>::default();
        let mut counter = 0u32;

        // Derive subkeys from the master key-generating-key in counter mode.
        //
        // From RFC8452 § 4: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8452#section-4>
        //
        // > The message-authentication key is 128 bit, and the message-encryption
        // > key is either 128 (for AES-128) or 256 bit (for AES-256).
        // >
        // > These keys are generated by encrypting a series of plaintext blocks
        // > that contain a 32-bit, little-endian counter followed by the nonce,
        // > and then discarding the second half of the resulting ciphertext.  In
        // > the AES-128 case, 128 + 128 = 256 bits of key material need to be
        // > generated, and, since encrypting each block yields 64 bits after
        // > discarding half, four blocks need to be encrypted.  The counter
        // > values for these blocks are 0, 1, 2, and 3.  For AES-256, six blocks
        // > are needed in total, with counter values 0 through 5 (inclusive).
        for derived_key in &mut [mac_key.as_mut_slice(), enc_key.as_mut_slice()] {
            for chunk in derived_key.chunks_mut(8) {
                block[..4].copy_from_slice(&counter.to_le_bytes());
                block[4..].copy_from_slice(nonce.as_slice());

                key_generating_key.encrypt_block(&mut block);
                chunk.copy_from_slice(&block.as_slice()[..8]);

                counter += 1;
            }
        }

        let result = Self {
            enc_cipher: Aes::new(&enc_key),
            polyval: Polyval::new(&mac_key),
            nonce: *nonce,
        };

        // Zeroize all intermediate buffers
        // TODO(tarcieri): use `Zeroizing` when const generics land
        #[cfg(feature = "zeroize")]
        {
            use zeroize::Zeroize;
            mac_key.as_mut_slice().zeroize();
            enc_key.as_mut_slice().zeroize();
            block.as_mut_slice().zeroize();
        }

        result
    }

    /// Encrypt the given message in-place, returning the authentication tag.
    pub(crate) fn encrypt_inout_detached(
        mut self,
        associated_data: &[u8],
        buffer: InOutBuf<'_, '_, u8>,
    ) -> Result<Tag, Error> {
        if buffer.len() as u64 > P_MAX || associated_data.len() as u64 > A_MAX {
            return Err(Error);
        }

        self.polyval.update_padded(associated_data);
        self.polyval.update_padded(buffer.get_in());

        let tag = self.finish_tag(associated_data.len(), buffer.len());
        init_ctr(&self.enc_cipher, &tag).apply_keystream_partial(buffer);

        Ok(tag)
    }

    /// Decrypt the given message, first authenticating ciphertext integrity
    /// and returning an error if it's been tampered with.
    pub(crate) fn decrypt_inout_detached(
        mut self,
        associated_data: &[u8],
        mut buffer: InOutBuf<'_, '_, u8>,
        tag: &Tag,
    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
        if buffer.len() as u64 > C_MAX || associated_data.len() as u64 > A_MAX {
            return Err(Error);
        }

        self.polyval.update_padded(associated_data);

        // TODO(tarcieri): interleave decryption and authentication
        init_ctr(&self.enc_cipher, tag).apply_keystream_partial(buffer.reborrow());
        self.polyval.update_padded(buffer.get_out());

        let expected_tag = self.finish_tag(associated_data.len(), buffer.len());

        use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
        if expected_tag.ct_eq(tag).into() {
            Ok(())
        } else {
            // On MAC verify failure, re-encrypt the plaintext buffer to
            // prevent accidental exposure.
            init_ctr(&self.enc_cipher, tag).apply_keystream_partial(buffer);
            Err(Error)
        }
    }

    /// Finish computing POLYVAL tag for AAD and buffer of the given length.
    fn finish_tag(&mut self, associated_data_len: usize, buffer_len: usize) -> Tag {
        let associated_data_bits = (associated_data_len as u64) * 8;
        let buffer_bits = (buffer_len as u64) * 8;

        let mut block = polyval::Block::default();
        block[..8].copy_from_slice(&associated_data_bits.to_le_bytes());
        block[8..].copy_from_slice(&buffer_bits.to_le_bytes());
        self.polyval.update(&[block]);

        let mut tag = self.polyval.finalize_reset();

        // XOR the nonce into the resulting tag
        for (i, byte) in tag[..12].iter_mut().enumerate() {
            *byte ^= self.nonce[i];
        }

        // Clear the highest bit
        tag[15] &= 0x7f;

        self.enc_cipher.encrypt_block(&mut tag);
        tag
    }
}

/// Initialize counter mode.
///
/// From RFC8452 § 4: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8452#section-4>
///
/// > The initial counter block is the tag with the most significant bit
/// > of the last byte set to one.
#[inline]
fn init_ctr<Aes>(cipher: Aes, nonce: &cipher::Block<Aes>) -> Ctr32LE<Aes>
where
    Aes: BlockSizeUser<BlockSize = U16> + BlockCipherEncrypt,
{
    let mut counter_block = *nonce;
    counter_block[15] |= 0x80;
    Ctr32LE::inner_iv_init(cipher, &counter_block)
}